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•   First, the purchase of commodity certificates (typically in
the amount of what is needed to pay off the CCC marketing
assistance loan) produces an income tax basis in the
certificate equal to its face amount (not an income tax
deduction).18  That is because the certificate is acquired for
resale, not for use in the business.
•   Second, using the commodity certificate to pay off the
CCC loan (the lesser of the CCC loan or the posted county
price) does not produce gain on the certificate but does
produce marketing assistance loan gain.
Example 1.  Corn is placed under CCC loan in the amount
of $1.87 per bushel in 2001.  In 2001, the commodity is
redeemed when the county posted price is $1.50 per bushel.
The corn is sold later in 2001 for $1.75.  If the taxpayer had
not made the I.R.C. § 77(a) election, the taxpayer would have
no income to report in 2000 but would have $1.75 per bushel
gain on the crop itself in 2001 plus $.37 per bushel of
marketing loan gain.  The commodity certificate used to
redeem the corn from the CCC loan would be treated the
same as money with the certificate worth $1.50 per bushel
(and having an income tax basis equal to $1.50 per bushel)
used to pay off the CCC loan which requires payment of
$1.50 per bushel either in cash or certificate.  The net amount
of income per bushel is $1.75 + .37 or $2.12 per bushel.
Example 2.  Assuming the same facts as in Example 1
except that the taxpayer has elected to treat CCC loan
amounts as income,19 the taxpayer would have $1.87 per
bushel of gain in 2000, the year the CCC loan is taken out.
That would become the income tax basis of the crop.  On
redemption at $1.50 per bushel in 2001, the taxpayer would
trigger a marketing assistance loan gain of $.37 per bushel.
When the crop is sold later in 2001 for $1.75 per bushel, the
taxpayer would have a loss of $.12 per bushel (basis of $1.87
per bushel and a selling price of $1.75 per bushel).  The net
gain to the taxpayer, over both years, is $1.87 + $.37 - $.12 or
$2.12, the same as in Example 1.  However, $1.87 would be
reported in 2000 with the balance reported in 2001.
The argument has been made, based in part on the 1987
revenue ruling20 and in part on a subsection of the Internal
Revenue Code21 that taxpayer should be allowed to deduct
the marketing assistance loan gain ($.37 per bushel in the
above example) from the income tax basis per bushel ($1.87)
rather than to report the $.37 currently (in 2001).  That would
enable the marketing assistance loan gain to be deferred until
the crop is sold (which would be a benefit if the crop were
sold after 2001).
The Internal Revenue Service has been asked to allow the
ded c ion of the marketing assistance loan gain from the
income tax basis of the crop (where CCC loan proceeds are
treated as income).  No decision has been made on the matter
as of press time.
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ANIMALS
HORSES. The plaintiff was injured by a horse bite while
visiting riding stables owned by the defendant. The plaintiff
was invited to the stables by another child whose parents
belonged to the stable association. The defendant argued that
the court should change the case law precedents and hold
stable owners strictly liable for injuries caused by the horses.
The defendant noted that the state had a statute which
imposed strict liability on dog owners. The court refused to
extend the dog owner’s law to horse owners, noting that the
legislature could have included horse owners in the strict
liability statute. The court held that the defendant was not
liable for the injury because the defendant was not aware
that children of the association members were inviting
friends to the stables and feeding the horses. For the same
reaso , the court refused to held that the stable was an
attr ctive nuisance as a basis for the defendant’s liability. In
addition, the court noted that the injured child testified that
the child was well aware of the dangers of feeding the horses
and kn w the proper way to feed the horses by hand. Pullan
v. Steinmetz, 16 P.3d 1245 (Utah 2000).
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BANKRUPTCY
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. The IRS has ruled, in
a Chief Counsel Advice letter, that post-petition taxes in a
chapter 13 case are not eligible for administrative expense
status because the bankruptcy estate is not a separate taxable
entity. CCA Ltr. Rul. 200113027, Feb. 8, 2001.
DISCHARGE . The debtor, a surgeon, failed to file and
pay income taxes for 10 years, during which the debtor
suffered from alcoholism. The court found that the debtor
did no affirmative acts to avoid payment of the taxes but that
the debtor was merely indifferent to paying the taxes, a
condition caused by the alcoholism. Once the debtor sought
treatment for the alcoholism, the debtor fully cooperated
with the IRS and filed all of the unfiled returns. The
Bankruptcy Court held that the taxes were dischargeable
because the debtor did not willfully attempt to evade
payment of the taxes. The Bankruptcy Court reiterated the
holding in In re Haas, 48 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 1997) that the
mere failure to file and pay taxes when able to do so was not
sufficient to render the taxes nondischargeable. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the debtor’s failure to
file and pay the taxes was sufficient conduct to make the
taxes nondischargeable where the debtor knew that the taxes
and returns were due. The court noted that the debtor had
sufficient control over the debtor’s alcoholism to perform
surgery; therefore, the alcoholism was insufficient to make
the failure to file and pay the taxes less than willful. In re
Fretz, 2001-U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,470 (11th Cir.




CONFERENCES. A conference, "Fixing the Farm Bill,"
was held at the National Press Club, Washington, DC, on
March 27, 2001.  The conference was organized by John A.
Schnittker, Schnittker Associates, Santa Ynez, California,
and Neil E. Harl, Director, Center for International
Agricultural Finance, Iowa State University.  For access to
the papers see web site:
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/harl/FFB/ffb.html.
GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS . The
Washington Post has reported that a Canadian canola farmer
was successfully sued by Monsanto Co. for failing to pay
licensing fees for the use of canola seeds produced by plants
pollinated by genetically modified canola in neighbors’
fields.  The result means that farmers who plant non-GMO
crops near GMO crops cannot save any seeds for replanting
without paying the licensing fee to the GMO patent owner.
M. Kaufman, “Court Says Canadian Used Company’s
Plants, Washington Post, March 30, 2001.
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
LEGISLATION . The U.S. House of Representatives has
passed legislation which would replace the unified credit
with a  xemption ($700,000 in 2002-2003, $850,000 in
2004, $950,000 in 2005 and $1,000,000 in 2006 and later).
The legislation would also repeal  I.R.C. § 1014 (new basis
of estate property at death) after 2010; provide for up to
$1,300,000 basis increase thereafter for each estate with
$3,000,000 in additional maximum basis increase for
surviving spouses; and increase from 15 to 45 the number of
partners/shareholders allowable for 15-year installment
payment of federal estate tax. H.R. 8.
Legislation has been introduced in the U.S. House of
Representatives which would eliminate the limit on the
family-owned business deduction. H.R. 1210. Legislation
has been introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives
which would exclude the tax on any gain from the sale of a
qualified family farm to a family member who continues to
materially participate in the operation of the farm. H.R.
1179.
BELOW-MARKET INTEREST LOANS . A corporation
w s owned by many members of one family, none with a
majority interest. The corporation made no-interest loans to
several entities which were owned in part by the
shareholders of the corporation and by nonshareholder
family members. The IRS assessed taxes for interest income
deemed earned by the taxpayers, under I.R.C. § 7872. The
taxpayers argued that Section 7872 applied only for loans
from a corporation to majority shareholders. The court held
that the rules applied to below-market interest loans from the
corporation to any shareholder or to entities owned by
shareholders. The appellate court affirmed in a decision
designated as not for publication. Rou tree Cotton Co.,
Inc. v. Comm’r, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,316
(10th Cir. 2001), aff’g, 113 T.C. No. 28 (1999).
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The decedent’s will
provided a bequest to the decedent’s brother in trust with a
remainder to a charitable organization. The trust was not a
qualified charitable trust since the brother had the power to
invade the trust without limit. However, after receiving only
$33,000, the brother died before the estate filed its tax
return. The other heirs challenged the will and agreed to
drop the contest in exchange for receiving the right to seek a
charitable deduction for the estate, thus increasing the
remainder estate which passed to these heirs. The court held
that I.R.C. § 2055(e)(3)(F) applied to the trust. Under section
2055(e)(3)(F) the trust became reformed upon the death of
the brother because the brother’s death fixed the amount
passing under the trust to the charity; therefore, the amount
passing under the trust was eligible for the charitable
deduction. The IRS argued that the brother’s receipt of funds
from the trust removed the trust from application of section
2055(e)(3)(F), but the court held that the statute contained no
exception for cases where the trust beneficiary receives a
portion of the trust before dying. On reconsideration, the
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court held that the trust was not eligible for a charitable
deduction because the reformation did not occur until after
the brother had received distributions from the trust.
Harbison v. United States, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
60,398 (N.D. Ga. 2001), vac’g on reconsid., 2000-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,389 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
CLAIMS . The decedent had received from a predeceased
spouse an usufruct (life estate) in mineral rights in land, with
the remainder passing to the decedent’s children. The
decedent received the royalties over several years before
death. The estate deducted the value of the royalties received
as a claim of the children against the estate. The estate
argued that the decedent was required to account for and
repay any royalties received and retained during the
usufruct. The court examined state law and the predeceased
spouse’s will and held that the type of usufruct granted to the
decedent did require the decedent to account for and repay
any mineral royalties received during the usufruct; therefore,
the children were entitled to repayment from the estate and
the estate was entitled to a deduction for the amount paid.
The appellate court affirmed in a decision designated as not
for publication.  Marshall v. Comm’r, 2001-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,397 (5th Cir. 2001), aff’g 99-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,360 (E.D. La. 1999).
DEDUCTIONS. The decedent had redeemed stock
received from the estate of a predeceased spouse. The
decedent realized gain on the redemption, based on the basis
in the stock established by the predeceased spouse’s estate
for federal estate tax purposes. The decedent’s estate tax
return claimed a deduction for the federal income tax paid on
the stock redemption. The predeceased spouse’s estate tax
return was audited and the value of the stock was increased,
thus increasing the decedent’s basis in the stock and
decreasing the income tax liability. The decedent’s estate
filed for a refund which was allowed. The IRS then assessed
a deficiency against the decedent’s estate tax because of a
decrease in the deduction for federal income tax. The estate
argued that post-death events should not be considered in
determining the amount of a deduction which was valid on
the date of the decedent’s death. The estate cited Propstra v.
United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982) and Estate of
Sachs v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 769 (1987), rev’d, 856 F.2d 1158
(8th Cir. 1988) which did not allow changes based on post-
death events. The Tax Court distinguished the current case
on the basis that the estate here had requested the refund of
income taxes, demonstrating that the income tax liability
was contingent as of the decedent’s death. The Tax Court
held that the income tax deduction for estate tax purposes
had to be decreased by the amount of the refund. The Tax
Court also held that the deduction for state income taxes was
also decreased since the state tax liability was dependent
upon the estate’s income tax liability. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the post-death events cannot be
considered in valuing a deduction. Est. of McMorris v.
Comm’r, 2001 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,396 (10th Cir.
2001), rev’g, T.C. Memo. 1999-82.
GROSS ESTATE. The decedent’s estate included an
interest in a QTIP trust received from the decedent’s
predeceased spouse. The trust owned 42 percent of farm
land. The land was contributed to a limited partnership;
owever, the operation of the farm, including management
of timber and peach orchards, was handled by a separate
general partnership in which the trust was not a partner. The
court held that the timber and orchard and other farm
personal property was not included in the QTIP trust
property because title were reserved by the decedent and
predeceased spouse and contributed to the general
partnership. Est. of Forbes v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-
72.
LIFE INSURANCE . The taxpayers, husband and wife,
stablish  a trust for the benefit of their parents and heirs.
The trusts owned life insurance policies on the lives of the
taxpayers. The trusts contributed the insurance policies to a
limited partnership in exchange for limited partnership
int r sts. The taxpayers were also limited partners in the
partners ip. The limited partnership also owned other
investment properties. Under I.R.C. § 101(a)(1) gross
income does not include amounts received under a life
insurance contract, if such amounts are paid by reason of the
death of the insured. However, under I.R.C. § 101(a)(2), if a
life insurance contract or any interest therein is transferred
for valuable consideration, the exclusion from gross income
provided by Section 101(a)(1) is limited to an amount equal
to the sum of the actual value of the consideration and the
premiums and other amounts subsequently paid by the
transferee. An exception to the Section 101(a)(2) rule is
provided in I.R.C. § 101(a)(2)(B) for insurance contracts
transferred to partnerships in which the insured is a partner.
The IRS ruled that the trust’s life insurance policies were
transferred for valuable consideration, the exchanged
partn rship interests, but that the exception applied because
the taxpayers were limited partners in the receiving
partnership. The IRS also ruled that the partnership held all
the incid nts of ownership such that the policies would not
be inclu ed in the taxpayers’ estates. Ltr. Rul. 200111038,
Dec. 15, 2000.
VALUATION . The decedent’s estate included an interest
in a QTIP trust received from the decedent’s predeceased
spouse. The trust owned 42 percent of farm land. The court
held that the value of the land for federal estate tax purposes
could be discounted by 30 percent of the fair market value.
Est. of Forbes v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-72.
The taxpayers established a trust for themselves, with
remainders to their children. The taxpayers transferred to the
trust a residence which included an 8.7 acre main lot, a one-
seventh interest in a 16.7 wooded lot and easements granting
access to the properties which ran between the two parcels.
The IRS ruled that the entire property qualified as a personal
residence and that the trust was a qualified personal
residence trust. Ltr. Rul. 200112018, Dec. 15, 2000.
VALUATION OF STOCK . The decedent owned 19.86
percent of the stock of a family-owned S corporation, the
largest block of stock owned by any one shareholder. The
estate valued the stock at $29.77 per share, based upon a pre-
death appraisal and two post-death sales of stock by other
family members to another family member. The sales were
made without negotiation and without any determination of
the fair arket value of the stock. The court held that the
post-death sales were not determinative of the value of the
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stock because the transactions were not negotiated and the
number of shares sold was much smaller than the decedent’s
holdings. The estate presented an expert appraiser’s
appraisal of the stock in support of the $29.77 value but the
Tax Court found that the appraiser’s valuation was defective
because it was based solely upon sale of the stock to other
shareholders, which was not required by the corporation’s
bylaws. The Tax Court held that the IRS valuation of the
stock was to be used because the estate failed to present
sufficient evidence to rebut that valuation. The appellate
court reversed, holding that the post-death sale of stock was
representative of the fair market value because the sellers did
not have to sell the stock, the buyers obtained an appraisal
from a brokerage, and the buyers were not closely related to
the sellers or the decedent. Morrissey v. Comm’r, 2001-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,395 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’g sub.
nom., Estate of Kaufman v. Comm’r, T. C. Memo. 1999-
119.
The taxpayers had transferred by gift stock in a closely-
owned corporation and had valued the stock at $175.24 per
share for gift tax purposes. IRS had issued a deficiency
notice based upon an income-based appraised value of
$260.13 per share. At trial both parties presented expert
valuations, with the IRS expert valuing the stock at $260.61
per share on a market-based approach. The court held that
the taxpayer’s expert’s valuation was flawed; therefore,
because the taxpayer failed to provide evidence to support
the taxpayer’s valuation of the stock, the IRS value in the
notice of deficiency was presumed correct and upheld. Wall
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-75.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
LEGISLATION . CCH has published a report by the Joint
Committee on Taxation on an overview of current and
proposed taxation law for small business and agriculture.
JCX-19-01.
BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer operated a
financial planning business as well as maintained
employment with a bank. The taxpayer claimed business
deductions for depreciation, office expenses, meals and
travel expenses. Most of the items were substantiated only
by entries in a daily planner and credit card monthly
statements. The court found that several of the daily planner
entries were not clear as to the business purpose for the
expense and held that only the expenses clearly substantiated
as to date, amount and business purpose were allowed as
deductions. Bishop v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-82.
The taxpayer was not allowed business deductions for
more than those allowed by the IRS because the taxpayer did
not keep any records of the amounts, dates and purposes of
the expenses. Gapikia v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-83.
COOPERATIVES . The IRS has announced that it
acquiesces in the following case. The taxpayer was a
nonexempt agricultural cooperative which owned directly or
through stock ownership oil and gas refinery businesses
which provided petroleum products to the members of the
taxpayer. The taxpayer sold the stock and properties when
the businesses became nonprofitable and the issue was
whether the proceeds of the sales were patronage-sourced
income. The court held that the proceeds were patronage-
sourced income because the property was directly related to
the axpayer’s business with its members. The court rejected
the IRS argument that all capital gain was nonpatronage-
s urc d income. Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1999-388, acq., I.R.B. 2001-__.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The
taxpayer owned property neighboring a petroleum
processing plant. The taxpayer complained about the odors
and appearance of the plant and the plant owners agreed to
purchase the taxpayer’s property for cash and 450 acres of
property elsewhere. The taxpayer signed a release of all
claims against the plant owners. The court held that, under
Texas law, an action for emotional harm could not result
from the lawful operation of the plant. The court also held
that the taxpayer had not made any claim in tort for personal
harm but that the proceeds were paid in compensation for the
property rights transferred to the plant owners; therefore, the
proceeds were included in the taxpayer’s gross income to the
extent they exceeded the taxpayer’s basis in the property.
The appellate court affirmed in a decision designated as not
for publication. Holland v. United States, 2001-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,465 (5th Cir. 2001), aff’g, 2000-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,465 (S.D. Texas 2000).
The taxpayer was a former employee of an employer who
was sued by class action for overtime compensation,
liquidated damages, attorney fees and costs. The taxpayer
was a member of the class but did not actively participate in
the suit. The action was settled and the taxpayer received a
portion of the settlement. The taxpayer did not include any
of the proceeds in income, arguing that the proceeds
represented compensation for personal injury from racial
discrimination claims against the employer. The court noted
that no racial discrimination claims were raised as part of the
class action lawsuit or settlement negotiations. The court
held that the proceeds were included in the taxpayer’s
income as back pay, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and
costs. The IRS acknowledged that the taxpayer was entitled
to an itemized deduction for the attorneys’ fees and costs.
Waters v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-46; Nelson
v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-44.
DISASTER PAYMENTS . The IRS has issued additional
guidelines for extensions for filing returns and paying
estimated, income, gift and estate taxes for persons suffering
losses from the 2000 Cerro Grande fire in New Mexico. IR-
2001-42.
On March 20, 2001, the President determined that certain
areas in Maine were eligible for assistance under the
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §
5121, as a result of near-record snow on March 5-7, 2001.
FEMA-3164-EM. Accordingly, a taxpayer who sustained a
loss attributable to the disasters may deduct the loss on his or
her 2000 federal income tax return.
MARKET SEGMENT TRAINING GUIDE . The IRS
has announced the publication of a revised Market Segment
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Specialization Program Audit Technique Guide—IRC
Section 183: Farm Hobby Losses with Cattle Operations and
Horse Activities.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in March 2001,
the weighted average is 5.87 percent with the permissible
range of 5.29 to 6.17 percent (90 to 106 percent permissible
range) and 5.29 to 6.46 percent (90 to 110 percent
permissible range) for purposes of determining the full
funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 2001-
28, I.R.B. 2001-13, 944.
The taxpayer an attorney who operated the practice
through a professional corporation. The corporation
provided a pension plan in which the taxpayer was the sole
participant. The plan allowed loans of up to 50 percent of the
vested interest in the plan for up to five years. The taxpayer
borrowed money from the plan. The loan agreement
provided for monthly payments of principal and interest over
five years with a large balloon payment at the end of the
term. The monthly payments would require 15 years to repay
the loan. The court held that the loan was included in the
taxpayer’s income in the year made because the loan
violated I.R.C. §§ 72(p)(2)(B)(i) or 72(p)(2)(C) in that the
loan either exceeded the five year limitation of Section
72(p)(2)(B)(i) or the level amortization amount requirement
of Section 72(p)(2)(C). Plotkin v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2001-71.
RETURNS. The IRS has released revised Publication 51
(Rev. January 2001), Circular A, Agricultural Employer's
Tax Guide (Including 2001 Wage Withholding and Advance
Earned Income Credit Payment Tables) and Publication
1779, Independent Contractor or Employee (Rev. 12-99).
These documents are available at no charge (1) by calling
the IRS's toll-free telephone number, 1-800-829-3676; (2)
via the internet at http://www.irs.gov/prod/cover.html; (3)
through FedWorld; or (4) by directly accessing the Internal
Revenue Information Services bulletin board at (703) 321-
8020.
The IRS has announced that it will follow the holding of
Weisbart v. United States, 222 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2000), rev'g,
99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,549 (E.D. N.Y. 1999), which
held that, under I.R.C. § 7502(a), a claim for refund on a
delinquent original return will be considered filed on the
postmark date. This rule will apply to other tax returns as
well. Final regulations have been issued which are consistent
with this announcement. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7502-1(f), 66
Fed. Reg. 2257 (Jan. 11, 2001). CC-2001-019.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayer, a certified public
accountant, sold a residence in December 1993. In August
1995, a corporation wholly-owned by the taxpayer
completed a residence. The taxpayer used the residence for
temporary sleeping quarters but kept the taxpayer’s personal
belongings in the taxpayer’s camper. The corporation
accepted a third party offer to buy the house in November
1995. In early December, the corporation executed a
quitclaim deed for the house to the taxpayer in exchange for
an offset of debt owed to the taxpayer. On December 26,
1995, the taxpayer quitclaimed the title to the house back to
the corporation which then sold it to the third party. The
court held that the sale of the house to the taxpayer was not
bona fide and did not qualify the taxpayer for deferment of
gain from the sale of the first house. Because the purchase of
the house was not bona fide and was made solely to qualify
the taxpayer for the deferral of gain, the court upheld the IRS
assessment of the accuracy-related penalty. Bare v
Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-48.
The taxpayer purchased a new residence before selling the
old residence. The old residence was rented until it was sold
more than two years after the purchase of the new residence.
The taxpayer sought a court ruling which would allow the
deferment of gain, even though the two year period had
expired. The court held that it had no jurisdiction to extend
the two year period of I.R.C. § 1034(a). Anthony v.
Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-41.
SOCIAL SECURITY TAX . The taxpayer had reported
self-employment income and expenses and earned income
credit on a timely filed return which claimed a refund. The
IRS audited the return and disallowed the self-employment
income and expenses and earned income credit, resulting in
a tax deficiency which was paid by the taxpayer. The IRS
notified the Social Security Administration of the abatement
of the self-employment taxes for SSA purposes. The
taxpayer later submitted information which supported the
income and expenses and filed for a refund again after the
statute of limitations had run on assessment of the self-
employment taxes. In addition, the IRS had no authority or
procedure to notify the SSA of the repayment of self-
employment taxes. In a Service Center Advice letter, the IRS
ruled that the self-employment taxes could still be offset
against the last refund claim, even though the assessment
limitation period had expired. The IRS also stated that
procedures would be created for notifying the SSA of late
changes in the payment of social security taxes in cases
similar to the one in this letter. SCA Ltr. Rul. 200113002,
May 30, 2000.
THEFT LOSS . The taxpayer entered into a contract with
an out-of-state company to sell that company’s product. The
taxpayer paid a fee of $24,000 but was unable to ever
receive sufficient product to carry on the business. The
taxpayer made several attempts in 1994 to obtain the return
of the taxpayer’s investment but was unsuccessful. The
taxpayer claimed to have continued to try to recover the
investment in 1995 and 1996 but presented no substantiating
evidence. The taxpayer claimed a theft loss deduction in
1996. The court held that the taxpayer failed to demonstrate
that a theft loss had occurred and that the loss occurred in
1996. Gupta v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-47.
INSURANCE
BAD FAITH. The plaintiff had obtained a real and
personal property insurance policy from the defendant.
Because the policy excluded coverage for loss of animals
from freezing, the plaintiff purchased extra coverage for this
loss. The plaintiff lost 297 cattle in two separate snow
storms and filed for recovery of the loss from the defendant.
The defendant refused to pay the loss until each animal had
been necropsied, which required the plaintiff to thaw each
animal and have it examined by a veterinarian for cause of
death and then retain the animals. The defendant told the
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plaintiff that the plaintiff had to prove the cause of death,
even though the policy covered all losses. The defendant
eventually refused to cover the losses because the plaintiff
did not completely own the animals. The plaintiff had
obtained investors who contributed money in exchange for a
portion of the profits from the animals. The court found that
the policy referred only to the insured as “owner” of the
property but did not provide any definition of that term. The
policy did not provide that partial ownership was not
covered under the policy. The plaintiff received a jury
verdict for actual, bad faith and punitive damages. The court
rejected the defendant’s argument that the policy required
100 percent ownership of covered property. The court noted
that the defendant was aware of the plaintiff’s partial interest
in the cattle before and after the policy was purchased and
failed to inform the plaintiff that the policy would not fully
cover animals in which the plaintiff had a partial interest.
The court held that the policy use of the word “owner” was
ambiguous and would be interpreted against the defendant as
the drafter of the document. The court also upheld the award
for bad faith because the evidence demonstrated that the
defendant attempted to discredit the plaintiff, attempted to
hide facts, and placed an unreasonable demand on the
plaintiff to have the cattle necropsied and stored on the farm
for several months. The evidence even included a tape
recording of the defendant’s agents plotting how they could
avoid paying on the claim. The court also upheld the
punitive damages for the same reasons. S wyer v. Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 619 N.W.2d 644 (S.D. 2000)
PRODUCT LIABILITY
HERBICIDE- ALM  § 2.04.* The plaintiffs were wheat and
barley farmers and applied to their crops herbicide
manufactured by the defendant. For several weeks after the
application, the nighttime temperatures were near or below
freezing. A state Department of Agriculture expert told the
plaintiffs that cold temperatures could cause damage to crops
treated with the herbicide. The plaintiffs sued in negligence,
breach of warranty and strict liability, claiming that the
defendant was negligent in manufacturing, advertising and
selling a product which could cause damage when applied at
the normal time for application, in the spring when the
nights were cold. The trial court dismissed all claims as
preempted by FIFRA. The appellate court held that the
negligence action was preempted by FIFRA because the
action was based on the defendant’s failure to warn about the
cold problem. The court held that the breach of warranty
action was not necessarily preempted by FIFRA because the
plaintiff alleged some representations were made by agents
of the defendant during the sale of the herbicide. The court
also allowed the strict liability claim to remain until
discovery was completed by the parties to see if any actions
by the defendant, outside of the label, gave rise to a strict
liability claim. The court noted that the EPA approval of the
herbicide label did not absolve the defendant of all liability
where the product was advertised and sold in areas where the
product would not work according to the label instructions.
On remand to the trial court, a jury verdict was returned for
the defendant manufacturer. The trial court had given a jury
instruc ion which required that, for the defendant to be held
strictly liable, the jury must find that the herbicide was in a
“defective condition unreasonably dangerous.” The appellate
court held that this instruction was improper in that the
“unreasonably dangerous” language was superfluous and
co fusing because a herbicide which was defective was
unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law. The plaintiffs
also app aled the jury verdict on the basis that it should have
been allowed to present evidence of the content of the
herbicide label. The defendant argued that, even under the
prior appellate holding of this case, FIFRA preempted all
state law damage claims involving information on the label.
The c urt held that, in Sleath v. West Mont, 16 P.2d 1042
(Mo . 2000), it reversed its prior ruling in this case;
therefore, the label contents were admissible and the trial
c urt’s refusal to allow the evidence was reversible error.
Earlier case: McAlpine v. Rhone-Poulenc Ag. Co., 947 P.2d
474 (Mont. 1997). McAlpine v. Rhone-Poulenc Ag. Co., 16
P.3d 1054 (Mont. 2000).
The plaintiffs were peanut farmers who had applied on
their crops a herbicide manufactured by the defendant. The
plaintiffs filed suit for strict liability, breach of express and
implied warranties, and violation of the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practice-Consumer Protection Act. The defendant
argued, and the trial court granted summary judgment on the
grounds, that the suit was preempted by FIFRA. The
plaintiffs claimed that the herbicide off-label advertisements
and brochures stated that the herbicide could be mixed with
another herbicide without damaging crops. In addition, the
herbicide label stated that it could be mixed with another
herbicide without damaging crops. The plaintiffs produced
evidence that the damage to their crops resulted from mixing
these two herbicides before applying them. The court noted
that the EPA had issued Pesticide Regulation Notice 96-4
which stated that the EPA would no longer consider the
efficacy of registered herbicides in the registration process.
The court also noted that this notice was merely a
restatement of a two decade practice by the EPA in not
considering the efficacy of registered herbicides. Therefore,
the court held that FIFRA did not preempt state court actions
involving herbicide labeling where the action involved the
ability of the herbicide to perform as indicated on the label.
This case conflicts with several other state court cases,
including cases which have discussed the effect of Notice
96-4. Geye v. American Cyanamid Co., 32 S.W.3d 916
(Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
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The Agricultural Law Press presents
2001 AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
   May 8-11, 2001  Airport Holiday Inn, Denver, CO
   June 19-22, 2001  Ramada Conference Center, Columbia, MO
   July 31, August 1-3, 2001  Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle, PA
   October 2-5, 2001  Interstate Holiday Inn, Grand Island, NE
Come join us for expert and practical seminars on the essential aspects of agricultural tax and law. Gain insight and
understanding from two of the nation’s top agricultural tax and law instructors.
The seminar are held at each site on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Registrants may attend one, two,
three or all four days, with separate pricing for each combination. On Tuesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch
income tax. On Wednesday, Dr. Harl will cover farm and ranch estate planning. On Thursday, Roger McEowen will
cover farm and ranch business planning. On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover current developments in several other
areas of agricultural law. Your registration fee includes comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days attended
which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for a small
additional charge. A buffet lunch and break refreshments are also included in the registration fee.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private annuities,
self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income
averaging; earned income credit; commodity futures transactions; paying wages in kind.
• Farm estate planning, including 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax, co-ownership discounts, alternate
valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business deduction (FOBD), marital deduction planning, disclaimers,
planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, trusts, and generation skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited liability
companies.
• Legal developments in farm contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and
environmental law.
Special room discounted rates are available at each hotel for seminar attendees.
The seminar registration fees   for current subscribers    (and for multiple registrations from one firm) to the Agricultural
Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles of Agricultural Law are $180 (one day), $345 (two days), $500
(three days), and $650 (four days).  The registration fees for    n subscribers   are $200, $385, $560 and $720, respectively.
Please Note: the registration fees are higher for registrations within 20 days prior to the seminar, so please call for
availability and the correct fees. More information and a registration form are available online at www. grilawpress.com
For more information, call Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail to robert@agrilawpress.com
